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Abstract 
 The idea that the establishment of a centrally planned system or the 
creation of a worker-controlled system amount to a socialist revolution is 
closely associated with the main contradictions that Marx highlighted in 
capitalism: the capital-labour conflict or the mismatch between planned 
production and anarchical distribution. Analysing these alternative forms of 
revolution, the author raises a number of questions: which of them fits 
human nature better? which of them is more closely associated with 
Darwinian evolutionism? is it correct to assume that democratic firm 
management tends to improve human nature? 
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Introduction 
 The claim that socialism can not only be implemented as a 
democratically managed planned economy, but also as a system of producer 
cooperatives is denied by orthodox Marxists who do not accept the equation 
of socialism with democratic firm control. On closer analysis, however, it is 
grounded in Marx’s own works. 
 Indeed, Marx once wrote: “If cooperative production is not to remain 
a sham and a snare; if it is to supersede the capitalist system; if the united 
co-operative societies are to regulate national production upon a common 
plan, thus taking it under their control, and putting an end to the constant 
anarchy and periodical convulsions which are the fatality of Capitalist 
production – what else, gentlemen, would it be but Communism, ‘possible’ 
Communism?” (Marx 1871, p. 335).  
 All the same – let this be repeated – most Marxists strongly doubt 
that Marx ever thought of a system of producer cooperatives as a new mode 
of production capable of taking the place of capitalism (see, inter alia, P. 
Marcuse 2015).   
 In point of fact, the idea of two alternative models of socialism is 
closely associated with the two main contradictions that Marx pointed up in 
capitalism: the capital-labour conflict and the mismatch between planned 
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production and anarchical distribution. Anyone emphasising the latter 
contradiction will think of socialism as a centrally planned economy, while 
those prioritising the capital-labour conflict will argue that socialism arises 
when the functions of the ‘primary factors of production’ are reversed upon 
the establishment a system of producer cooperatives of the LMF type (see 
Jossa 2010, pp. 262-63 and Jossa 2011).2526     
 The terms of the problem can be stated by raising a number of 
questions:  
  which of the above-mentioned forms of revolution fits human nature 
better? 
  which of them is more closely associated with Darwinian 
evolutionism?  
  is it correct to assume that democratic firm management tends to 
improve human nature? 
 The first question will be answered in the light of the recent 
biological theory that “genes are selfish”; the assumption for answering the 
second is, quite obviously, an analysis of Social Darwinism; the third 
question will just be touched upon since the relevant point was analysed in 
greater depth elsewhere (see Jossa 2014, chap. IX). 
 Accordingly, Section 2 provides a cursory outline of the modern 
biological theory of selfish genes; Section 3 examines Marx’s and Engels’s 
views concerning human nature; Section 4 analyses human nature from the 
perspective of the materialist conception of history; Section 5 offers a short 
analysis of Social Darwinism; Section 6 analyses the two suggested forms of 
socialism in order to establish which of them is in line with the assumption 
that human nature is shaped by selfish genes; Sections 7 draws the 
conclusions. 
  
The selfish gene 
 The biological theory that the actions of living beings are governed 
by selfish genes is well expounded in a book by Dawkins (1989) which 
raises the following questions: a) where altruism originates; and b) whether 
or not human beings are exceptions to the biological rule. 
 “We are survival machines – Dawkins writes (op. cit., p. vii) – robot 
                                                            
25 Although many of Marx’s writings bear witness to his concern with producer 
cooperatives, several commentators have argued that the relevant works are just descriptive 
in nature and do not reveal Marx’s overall evaluation of the real potential of cooperation 
(see (Lowit 1962, p. 79; see, also, Jossa 2005).  
26 The belief that there are two types of socialist revolution conflicts with the following 
saying by Bernstein (1901, p. 234): “I am singularly uninterested in understanding what 
people commonly mean by 'the final goal of socialism'. This goal, whatever it may be, 
means nothing to me; it is the movement itself which is everything.”  
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vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as 
genes. On being first made explicit in the nineteen-sixties – he argues – this 
idea appeared revolutionary, but today it has gained wide acceptance within 
the scientific community. Though originally deriving from Darwinism – he 
continues – it is expressed in a way which is not Darwin’s since rather than 
focus on the individual organism, it takes a gene’s eye view of nature.” 
Darwin’s theory of evolution, which today is nowhere called into question, 
explains why living beings exist and how they act; but, although great 
biologists such as Lorenz and Eibl-Eibesfeldt did tread in the wake of 
Darwin, they had as yet not fully realised how evolution works in actual 
fact. Only recently, major breakthroughs in biological research have 
highlighted the unitary nature of all living beings at microscope level (see 
Di Siena 1972, p. 244). In general terms, it is selfish genes that are 
responsible for the egoistic behaviour of individuals, but selfishness is a 
connotation of the gene, rather than the individual. It may come as a surprise 
that elementary chemical processes and all such within-body interactions as 
spark off the development and growth of all living beings, including 
humans, basically involve proteins, but this is what contemporary biology 
has taught (ibid.).  
 Nonetheless, there are circumstances under which the selfishness of 
a gene may foster a limited form of altruism in individual animals. Dawkins 
defines selfishness and altruism in behavioural, rather than subjective terms. 
An altruistic man, he argues, is one who helps others at the expense of his 
own well-being, but actions perceived as altruistic are often nothing but 
gestures of dissimulated selfishness. A typical case is the individual who 
will help others only on condition that he will receive something in return.  
 In Dawkins’s view, both the assumption that the instinct for survival 
connotes the species and the theory of ‘group selection’ that biologists long 
assumed to be true are actually misconceptions. It is not species, but genes, 
that engage in the Darwinian struggle for existence, and it is not true that the 
individual must be sacrificed for the sake of the superior interest of the 
species. Evolution is blind to the future: if only the genes had the gift of 
foresight – he adds (p. 10) – they could see that their best interests lie in 
restraining their selfish greed in order to prevent the extinction of their 
species.  
 Not always, however – Dawkins clarifies – are we obliged to obey 
our selfish genes; but where we should observe genuinely altruistic human 
behaviour, we would be “faced with something puzzling, something that 
needs explaining” (p. 6): “among animals, man is uniquely dominated by 
culture, by influences learned and handed down, and to understand altruism 
we have to understand the relation between nature and culture.”  
 Evolution is not only biological, but also cultural. The gene is not the 
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only basis of our ideas on evolution. What is unusual about man – Dawkins 
argues – can be summed up in a single word: ‘culture’ (p. 198). Although 
cultural transmission is not unique to man, it does carry far greater 
importance for the human species. In short, the role that altruism plays in 
human behaviour is closely intertwined with culture – in the broadest 
possible meaning of this word.27    
 In line with the above reflections, Dawkins concludes with the 
following statement: “if you wish to build a society in which individuals 
cooperate towards a common good, you can expect little help from 
biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are 
born selfish” (p. 5).28  
  
Marx and Engels on human nature 
 Before we attempt an assessment of Dawkins’s approach it is worth 
examining Marx’s view of human nature. 
 As is well known, Marx’s 6th Thesis on Feuerbach (which dates 
from 1845) states that the human essence is not something given, but it 
changes when the social relations change.29 The English version of Marx’s 
6th thesis on Feuerbach runs as follows: “Feuerbach resolves the religious 
essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction 
inherent in each individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social 
relations” (see Marx 1845, p. 7).30     
 The anthropological conception of man is also criticised in a later 
                                                            
27 Rawls (2000, p. 158) has pointed out that Kant, unlike Hume, held that any attempt at 
identifying this principle “does not proceed as part of a lager science of human nature, but 
begins analytically by elucidating the underlying principle(s) implicit in our commonsense 
judgments of moral worth.”   
28 Gobetti wrote (1924, p. 145): “Human actions are not always governed by logic; indeed, 
explanations which emphasise the role of rationality are as inadequate as those that prioritise 
the role of instincts.”   
29 Concerning Marx's conception of man and, specifically, his reflections on man in the 
Theses on Feuerbach, see Mondolfo 1909; Mondolfo 1962, pp. 312 ff.; Fromm 1961; 
Markus 1966 and a collection of papers by Schaff and Sève (see Schaff & Sève 1975).  
30 Schaff (1971) warns that this version of Marx's text is wrong although it features in quite a 
lot of French, Italian, Polish, Russian and other translations. The correct translation, he 
argues, which does appear in a few French and Italian versions (see Marx 1845, pp. 77 ff.), 
is not “the essence of man (das menschliche Wesen) is, in its reality, the ensemble of social 
relationships”, but “the individual (i.e. the non-abstract ‘man’) is, in his reality, the 
ensemble of the social relationships. And while it is true that this version somewhat bends 
the letter of Marx’s text, it is fully consistent with Marx’s thought. As argued by Althusser 
(1965a, pp. 218-19), “if we take this phrase literally ... it means nothing at all” because there 
is no such thing as a ‘human essence’, an abstract human being, and in order to trace a real, 
non-abstract man we have to turn to society.”  
For a more exhaustive analysis of Marx’s view of the essence of man, see Althusser 1965a, 
pp. 202-06, the Preface to Althusser 1965b and Sève 2004, pp.111-36.  
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work, The German Ideology, where Marx and Engels find fault with the 
tendency of philosophers to conceive of individuals no longer as subject to 
the division of labour, but as an ideal under the name of ‘Man’, “so that at 
every historical stage ‘Man’ was substituted for the individuals and shown 
as the driving force of history” (Marx and Engels 1845-46, p. 65). And in 
the much praised ‘Preface’ to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy, dated 1859, Marx spelt out in bold letters: “The mode of 
production of material life conditions the general process of social, political 
and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness”.31 
In Marxist terms, therefore, as people living in a capitalistic society tend to 
develop values and modes of being which depart from those prevailing in 
non-capitalistic contexts, to understand the real nature of human beings we 
have to focus on social relations of production.  
 In Marx’s words, “society is the complete unity of man with nature, 
... the consistent naturalism of man and the consistent humanism of nature”, 
and “just as society itself produces man so is society produced by him” 
(Marx 1844, p. 113). Analysing Marx’s approach to this issue in a fine book, 
written in 1948, Cornu claimed that the common thread running through 
modern philosophical thought is the grand issue of man’s integration into 
nature and society.  
 According to Marx, man’s basic unity with nature entails that nature 
undergoes continual changes as a result of human productive activity, that 
human beings realise themselves as they act upon nature and that the ambit 
affected by human action includes both the natural environment and the 
production system in which people operate. As pointed out by Cornu (1955, 
p. 455), Feuerbach, too, held that the essence of man is realised in his 
relations with the environment, but unlike Marx he thought of the natural, 
rather than social environment. 
 Although Marx rated the influence of the production context as more 
pervading than that of the natural environment, he, too, spelt out that the 
actions of human beings were influenced by nature. This is why he wrote 
(Marx 1844, pp. 122) that “history itself is a real part of natural history – of 
nature developing into man”, and then clarifies (op. cit., pp. 122-23): 
“sense-perception (see Feuerbach) must be the basis of all science. Only 
when it proceeds from sense-perception – in the two-fold form of sensuous 
consciousness and sensuous need – is it true science. History itself is a real 
                                                            
31 See Marx 1859, p. 5. Nonetheless, it is worth considering that Marx also wrote: “The 
materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that 
circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the educator himself. 
This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to 
society” (see Marx 1845, p. 3).   
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part of natural history – of nature developing into man. ... The social reality 
of nature, and human natural science, or the natural science of man, are 
identical terms” (Marx 1844, p. 137).  
 This begs the question if modern science – specifically the gene 
selfishness theory – is at odds with the belief (held both by Marx and 
Aristotle) that men and women are social beings because they are shaped by 
production relations, by the environment in which they live and by the 
interrelations they establish during their lives. From the perspective of 
Dawkins, inasmuch as it is true that such a contrast exists, it is easily solved 
because the awareness that selfishness is a connotation of genes, not 
individuals, makes it possible to assume that human nature, though 
influenced by gene selfishness, is likely to be principally shaped by the 
prevailing mode of production and by the environment – two influences that 
make for sociability and concern with one’s fellow-beings.  
  
More on human nature in different economic systems from the 
perspective of the materialist conception of history  
 In Marx’s approach, a mode of production is a form of society in 
which one prevailing production model, conceived of as a compound of 
productive forces and production relations, confers significance on the 
system as a whole (see Luporini 1966, p. 170). This is how Engels 
underscores the importance of this notion in his review of A Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy: “The proposition that ‘the process of 
social, political and intellectual life is altogether necessitated by the mode of 
production of material life’ ... was a revolutionary discovery not only for 
economics but also for all historical sciences – and all branches of science 
which are not natural sciences are historical sciences” (see Marx 1859, p. 
203).32 Similarly, Althusser remarked that Marx’s theorisation of modes of 
production and the way they arise, grow and die away is a formidable 
contribution to scientific knowledge. By virtue of this discovery, he added, 
Marx laid the foundations of a theory which is the true underpinning of all 
the sciences relevant to the ‘continent of history’, not only of history, 
sociology, human geography, economics, demographics, but also of 
psychology, ‘social psychology’, the disciplines generally known as ‘social 
sciences’ and, still more generally, all the ‘human sciences’ (see Althusser 
1969 and 1995, p. 23; see, also, Althusser 1972, pp. 50-51). According to 
Althusser, therefore, the notion of modes of production becomes central to 
historical materialism and, consequently, of Marxism as a whole (see 
                                                            
32 From Orfeo 1970 (p. 271) we learn that Antonio Labriola described the materialistic 
conception of history as “an effective means of splitting the huge and extremely complex 
working mechanism of society into its simplest constituent parts”.   
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Therborn 1971, p. 104).33  
 In other words, in Marx’s view it is only by monitoring the 
production relations in which human beings act out their respective roles 
that we can have a correct appreciation of their essence. And the reason is, 
men only exist thanks to these relations (Karsz 1974, p. 187).  
 While Marx’s stance is probably too radical to be shared, one need 
not be a Marxist or an advocate of the materialist conception of history to 
accept the idea that character and psyche are strongly influenced by the 
relations of production. In the opinion of Fromm (1962, p. 38), the 
assumption that something as a human nature or the essence of man should 
actually exist has long been a discredited theory and Karsz, for his part 
(1974, p. 176), has argued that any attempt at grasping what is termed the 
‘universal human spirit’ entails postulating the most idealistic of categories: 
human nature. Rawls, too, holds that economic and political institutions 
determine in part both the sort of persons we want to be and the sort of 
persons we actually are (Rawls 1971, p. 229).34  
 The influence of institutions on character would seem to justify the 
argument that one of the main defects of capitalism is its adverse impact on 
human nature.  
 With reference to historical materialism, a specialist in psychology 
reports that the findings of numerous surveys confirm that in capitalism 
selfishness and greed are specific to a higher social standing. More often 
than not, the members of the upper classes are seen to be less generous, less 
altruistic and also less cooperative than lower-class people (see Piff et al. 
2012); they are more likely to engage in unethical behaviour, tend to donate 
a smaller portion of their income to charity and are more likely to cheat. In 
other words, what is known as ‘the bourgeois mentality’ is typical of the 
upper middle class, rather than other classes of society. 
 The importance that upper class individuals attach to their position in 
society indicates that social class reshuffling may lead to changes in 
attitudes and that more collaborative attitudes are likely to develop in a 
cooperative system (see Ratner 2013). 
 As argued by Bataille, “the factory only knows of forces that may 
serve its purposes, proletarians, middlemen, accountants or technicians, but 
                                                            
33 Bloom (1943, p. 5) holds that the notion of society as shaped by its production methods is 
the climax of Marx’s doctrine and Althusser, for his part, emphasised that Marx’s 
theorisation of modes of production marked an epistemological break with the traditional 
approach to the philosophy of history (see Althusser 1965a, p. 217l). For the evolution of 
the concept of Marxism, see Haupt 1978, pp. 115-45.   
34 Authors endorsing this view include Donnaruma and Partyka (2012, p. 50), who stress the 
significant part that economic structures play in shaping the lives and conditions of people in 
society (Donnaruma & Partyka 2012, p. 50). 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ignores the individual whenever possible. Those caught up in the wheels of 
this system know nothing of meaningful interpersonal communication: a 
firm is driven on by flameless greed, it employs labour without heart and 
worships its own growth as the only divinity” (Bataille 1996, p. 64). More 
recently, the economist F. H. Hahn has highlighted a stark contrast between 
the innermost driving force of capitalism and generally recognised ethical 
values. The Jewish-Christian ethic, he argues, extols virtues such as 
benevolence and care for our fellow-beings, condemns greed and 
discourages the accumulation of treasures within this world. In line with this 
moral code, there is nothing to be admired in individuals who pursue their 
personal profit rather than sticking to their duties or taking care of their 
fellow-beings – i.e. in individuals who adopt exactly that kind of behaviour 
that is expected of people operating in a capitalistic system (see Hahn 
1993a, p. 10).35  
 This is the rationale behind my claim that in worker-controlled 
systems – compared to capitalism – greed would lose clout and benevolence 
and concern for others would become prominent.36 Self-management 
socialism is a system in which firms are run by workers who compete in 
markets, and there is general agreement, today, that the primary behavioural 
principle shaping economic activity in these firms is the aim to maximise 
the average income of all those working in them. It is not until 1958 that this 
principle (with which cooperation theorists are likely to have long been 
familiar) was consistently theorised by Ward. On closer analysis, however, 
far from constituting a newly-discovered behavioural principle 
supplementing selfish individualism and ethical motivation, the two general 
principles governing the actions of humans, the principle dictating the 
maximisation of per-capita incomes is nothing but the application of the 
utility principle to cooperation economics. In Keynes’s definition (see 
Keynes 1979, p. 66), self- management is an economic system in which the 
factors of production are remunerated by dividing the actual product of their 
joint input into prefixed pro-rata shares; and inasmuch as this is true, 
workers who strive to maximise individual utility in self-managed firms act 
rationally if they work towards maximising the aggregate income of the 
firm, because in this way they will maximise both their own and the other 
                                                            
35 An additional major point that will not be entered upon in this paper is Herbert Marcuse's 
claim that solidarity, though grounded in instinct, is stifled in a society which is based on 
classes and that the precondition for a climate of solidarity is consequently the suppression 
of class divisions – a goal that would be attained in a worker- controlled firm system (see 
Marcuse 1969, p. 22).   
36 Gustafsson also has recently emphasised that one of the salient characteristics of 
capitalism is to prioritise corrective motives and actions, rather than an impulse to 
cooperation (see Gustafsson 1993, p. XVI).   
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members’ shares in the residual of the firm.  
 In other words, although the per-capita income maximisation 
principle is consistent with the idea that people pursue their personal profit 
(and unrelated to the thesis that man is by nature altruistic), it acquires the 
connotations of a solidarity principle by virtue of the fact that within the 
framework of the specific nature and organisational criteria of cooperative 
firms it determines that the members striving to increase their own income 
will, by the same token, boost the incomes of their fellow-members. As a 
result, there are reasons for arguing that a cooperative firm system tends to 
breed feelings of solidarity that may counteract selfish drives in man.  
  
A short analysis of Social Darwinism  
 At the beginning I raised the question if Marx’s approach was 
consistent with Darwinism. Before this question is answered, it is necessary 
to establish whether we are to think of the Darwinian idea of evolution in 
nature or of Social Darwinism. 
 Although the claim that Darwin’s evolutionary theory can be 
extended to economics is now shared by a wealth of evolutionary theorists, 
including Veblen (see, inter alia, Hamilton, 1999, pp. 25-28 and Hodgson 
2003), I feel that the idea of a cumulative causation process assumed to be 
constantly at work in social life (the specific methodological point of 
Darwinism that Veblen tends to emphasise) should not be accepted without 
prior in-depth scrutiny. Modern-day science, Veblen wrote (1964, p. 21), 
theorises a process where causes and effects, far from being observed 
separately in their own right, are, as it were, the links of a chain formed of a 
continuous sequence of cumulative changes. In all branches of science – he 
specified (1964, p. 40) – research is invariably conducted as a process or 
active sequence, in terms that each finding becomes the starting point for the 
next step, in a cumulative sequence. In this connection, several 
institutionalists are said to use cumulative processes in their analyses 
(among authors holding this view, see Miller 2003, pp. 54-55 and Hodgson 
2003, pp. 87-90).  
 In point of fact, in economic theory a less rigorous cumulative 
causation process than Myrdal’s or Kaldor’s is envisaged as a possibility, 
but not as a general rule. The core idea behind economic theory is that 
economic processes tend to move towards stability – the exact opposite of 
the notion underlying cumulative causation;37 and while it is true that the 
importance of circular causation processes should not be underrated, I firmly 
hold that the equilibrium, rather than cumulative causation view is the 
                                                            
37 In a well-known 1953 book by Hamilton, cumulative causation and equilibrium are 
presented as antithetical principles (see Dugger 2003, pp. 65-66).   
European Scientific Journal March 2016 edition vol.12, No.8  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
130 
correct interpretative approach to economic phenomena.38  
 As mentioned by Hodgson, critics of the idea that economic 
phenomena unroll like a natural selection process include J. R. Commons, 
who claims that such evolutionary processes as are observed in the economy 
are not natural, but artificially induced (see Commons 1924, pp. 376). There 
is no denying that a great many authors have correctly objected that Darwin 
and Spencer did not rule out a measure of intentionality in the selection 
process, but spelt out in bold letters that any intentions, where assumed, had 
to be explained (see Copeland 1931 and 1936, pp. 343-44 and Hodgson 
2003, p. 91). Hence, Commons’s criticism of Social Darwinism is certainly 
congruent enough. The underlying rationale is the belief that socio-
economic evolution and biological evolution are governed by altogether 
different mechanisms (Hodgson 2003, p. 86).39 Whereas evolution 
determines the success of the fittest in either case (and in economic selection 
processes the fittest are usually those who are found to be most efficient), 
economic events are generally conditioned by the power issue and organised 
forces can halt the progress of any firm, however efficient.40 In the above 
wording, this objection is not aimed at the distinctively Darwinian principle 
of the survival of the fittest, but at a particular version of Social Darwinism 
in which economic power is equated with efficiency and the most efficient 
economic organisations are assumed to prevail in the long run.  
 Be that as it may, there are solid reasons for arguing that economic 
selection mechanisms differ greatly from those governing natural 
                                                            
38 In fact, most institutionalists reject the neo-classical approach to equilibrium as 
unacceptable (see, for example, Miller 2002, p. 252 and 2003, p. 52, as well as Hamilton 
2003, pp. 12-14).   
39 Marx, who was otherwise a great admirer of Darwin, denied the relevance of the 
Darwinian logic in areas such as history and politics.   
40 Authors critical of Social Darwinism include Bowles and Gintis. According to them, this 
argument misses the point since it fails to distinguish between economic-financial 
performance and efficiency. In competitive markets – they write (1986, p. 84) – survival is a 
function of profit, which should not be mistaken for efficiency. The distinction between 
profit and efficiency, they add, will be clearly recognized if we bear in mind that – assuming 
equal pay rates – profit is determined both by the output per labour unit generated in one 
hour of work and by the amount of work performed in one hour. And while it is true that the 
productivity level of the work performed is a good measure of efficiency, they conclude, the 
amount of work accomplished in a single hour is mainly an indicator of the employer’s 
ability to put in place effective control procedures. Accordingly, if the workers of a 
cooperative should outperform their capitalistic competitors by streamlining production 
processes more effectively, they would attain higher efficiency levels even though they 
should resolve to work at a slower pace and put up with lesser profits.   
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selection.41 In economic matters, to say that the fittest tend to prevail is just 
a tautology and, as such, will hardly add much to our understanding. Things 
would stand differently if it were possible to say, as social Darwinists 
mistakenly do, that the best economic performers are also the best 
organisations.  
 What, then, is the real bearing of Social Darwinism on a notion such 
as socialism? 
 The claim that workers are sure to acquire the right to self-manage 
their firms at some point in time is doubtless in line with the rationale 
behind Social Darwinism. Both Marx and Benedetto Croce were firmly 
persuaded that the long-term direction of history was one leading to ever 
greater freedom, while Social Darwinists, though holding that evolution 
proceeds in a given direction, reject any teleological approaches. Hence 
there is good ground for assuming that workers will in due time “get rid of 
the wage-yoke”, borrowing Giuseppe Mazzini’s words, and succeed in 
managing their firms on their own. The direction in which evolution is 
heading has as its starting point the sway of nature over man, the sway of 
capital over labour as an intermediate step and the liberation of man from 
the oppressive power of capital as its point of arrival.42 Inasmuch as it is true 
that history progresses in a precise direction, there can be little doubt that 
the economy will be heading towards self-management, a system in which 
alienation would be significantly lower compared to its level under 
capitalism (see Jossa 2012b). As mentioned in Finelli 2007 (p. 128), Marx 
looked upon capitalism as a reversed world where “alienation from labour 
and the impoverishment of the proletariat cannot exceed a certain level, at 
which the contradiction between the earning potential of the members of this 
class and the misery of their current circumstances will become so 
unbearable as to spark off the reversal of this reversal”.43   
 As far as Social Darwinism is concerned, the same cannot be said of 
centralised planning. Planning is hardly reconcilable with markets. The 
prerequisite for any attempt at reconciliation would be leaving with markets 
the most important choices – and this would be in stark contradiction with 
the very nature of planning. Accordingly, inasmuch as the rationale behind 
                                                            
41 In Hayek’ estimation, neither biological nor cultural evolution is governed by the laws of 
necessity, but cultural evolution, which is not genetically determined, generates diversity 
rather than uniformity (see Hayek 1982, pp. 35-37 and Leube 1988).   
42 Although Proudhon thought of property as the prerequisite for freedom, he objected to 
property when it was used as a tool for the exercise of man’s dominion over man (see Solari 
2012, p. 235).   
43 Evidence that democratic firm management is in the process of becoming a reality is 
provided by recent events in the United States, where companies establishing ‘employee 
stock ownership plans' (ESOPs) and firms attributing part of the ownership interests in their 
capital resources to the workforce have been granted considerable tax cuts.   
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planning is substituting centrally made choices for the choices made by 
individuals, there is no way of justifying it from the perspective of Social 
Darwinism. After all, it is difficult to see why individuals destined to attain 
ever more freedom should hand over their freedom of choice to a planning 
board which disregards the decisions made by the members of society.   
  
The selfish gene and socialism   
 One way to contrast socialism with capitalism is to liken socialism to 
Christianity and to argue that while capitalism is grounded in egoism and 
characterised by “the dependence of individuals who are indifferent to one 
another”, socialism is based on the need of individuals to entertain 
meaningful relationships with their fellow-beings (Marx 1857-58, p. 97). It 
is often argued that individuals are moved on by self-love and love for 
others, both of which are instincts that further the survival of the species,44 
and capitalism is said to differ from socialism because the former is the 
outgrowth of self-love and the latter is mainly based on harmonious 
relationships with our fellow-beings. This view is shared by the very known 
Italian journalist and intellectual Eugenio Scalfari (1995, pp. 836-47), who 
holds that morals are but a reflection of the instinct for survival of the 
human species.45  
 However, as advocates of the above-mentioned gene selfishness 
assumption tend to reject this distinction, it is convenient to follow the line 
of reasoning of those modern biologists who contend that genes are selfish, 
that the behaviour of all living beings is principally governed by their genes 
and that the survival instinct is not inherent in the species. These 
propositions may justify the contention that, while capitalism is the product 
of gene selfishness, socialism is typified by a special attention for culture, in 
addition to instinct, which leads it to prioritise all such organisational forms 
as may result in a favourable terrain for feelings of solidarity (Rifkin 
2009).46    
                                                            
44 In the words of Adam Smith, “No matter how selfish you think man is, it is obvious that 
there are some principles in his nature that give him an interest in the welfare of others […], 
pity and compassion” (see Smith 1759, pp. 203-04).   
45 In a well-known book, Singer (1980) provides an exhaustive analysis of the ethical 
foundations of Marx’s theoretical approach and concludes that all Marx’s propositions 
reflect the wish to get rid of a system in which individuals behave selfishly without the least 
regard to the needs of their fellow-beings.   
46 Commenting on Marx’s critique of the individualistic view of man, Cornu argues that the 
materialistic conception of history evokes a novel form of society which realises the true 
essence of man and illustrates how man can humanise nature by adapting it to his needs and 
organising society in line with humane principles (Cornu 1948, p.186). In point of fact, this 
view is barely acceptable since it seems to descend from the Aristotelian and Rousseauistic 
assumption that man is by nature unselfish.  
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 The reader is likely to wonder what bearing these reflections have on 
the claim that socialism can be established by creating a self-managed firm 
system. The answer seems to be that modern producer cooperative theory 
(to which the socialism-worker control equation is linked – see, for example, 
Jossa 2012 and Jossa 2014) – starts out from the assumption that individuals 
are selfish and is, hence, a realistic approach, while a centrally planned 
system will never function effectively since it fails to leverage either the 
profit motive or cultural interests.  
 This point requires to be analysed in greater depth. The above-
mentioned claim that selfishness is a connotation of genes, rather than 
individuals, suggests stating the terms of the problem as follows: inasmuch 
as the gene selfishness theory is correct and Dawkins and Marx are right 
when they claim that unselfishness is a child of culture – specifically of 
interrelations established in the workplace, the system that may outperform 
competing systems is one which at once leverages selfishness and creates 
solidarity relationships between individual producers. A system with these 
specifics does exist and is a system of producer cooperatives, since it is this 
system that both leverages the personal profit motive by apportioning the 
firm’s residual among the members and generates feelings of solidarity 
between them. At the other end of the spectrum is a centrally planned 
system, where the selfish drives of individuals are not heeded and where 
individual producers, far from being bound to each other by solidarity, fell 
hatred for the planning board which monitors their work inputs. On all 
accounts, to suggest that the generalised belief that work is being undertaken 
for the benefit of the community as a whole may breed adequate dedication 
to work and inter-worker solidarity is hardly realistic.  
 In other words, if culture is equated with the social environment and 
intellectual climate generated by a production mode, the argument that the 
culture of a centrally planned system with nationalised means of production 
breeds solidarity and commitment to production activities will barely hold. 
In Engels’s words, “in communist society, where the interests of individuals 
are not opposed to one another, but, on the contrary, are united, competition 
is eliminated ... Private gain, the aim of the individual to enrich himself on 
his own, disappears” (Engels 1945, p. 566). But is this sure to happen? The 
Soviet-type planning model may help stifle the selfish drives that reign 
supreme in a capitalistic society, but if genes are selfish, what breeding 
ground would be available for nourishing germs capable of fostering 
solidarity feelings in the population? And what may induce individuals to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Neither is it acceptable to argue, as Cornu does, that by assigning Communism the mission 
to reinstate humane and collective values within society, Marx emphasised the dialectical 
nature of social development and vested in the proletariat the role of the antagonist expected 
to work towards progress (op cit, p. 155).  
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produce despite their selfish genes? 
 Bearing in mind that revolutionary enthusiasm tends to be short-
lived, it is difficult to argue that culture, i.e. the desire for interpersonal 
relationships that culture tends to breed, should justify centralised planning. 
It is worker control, not planning, that generates solidarity by its very nature 
and that satisfies the need to entertain harmonious interpersonal 
relationships. As is well known, in worker-run firms all the members are 
equally interested in the efficient management of their firm and decisions 
are made jointly, often following in-depth discussion and exchanges of 
opinions. And it is hard to think of anything capable of generating more 
solidarity than the joint discussion of the means that will best help achieve 
shared goals.  
 The idea that association is a means of emancipating workers was 
shared by John Stuart Mill. If workers are joined into cooperatives (where 
they become ‘their own masters’) – he wrote – the productiveness of labour 
tends to increase thanks to “the vast stimulus given to productive energies” 
by the awareness of the members that their increased work inputs will boost 
their incomes, but this material benefit – he added – “is as nothing compared 
with the moral revolution in society that would accompany it” thanks to the 
potential of cooperation for furthering "the transformation of human life, 
from a conflict of classes struggling for opposite interests, to a friendly 
rivalry in the pursuit of a good common to all, the elevation of the dignity of 
labour, a new sense of security and independence in the labouring class; and 
the conversion of each human being's daily occupation into a school of the 
social sympathies and the practical intelligence” (Mill 1871, p. 744).47 
Elsewhere in the same book, Mill described cooperatives as “a course of 
education in those moral and active qualities by which alone success can be 
either deserved or attained” (Mill 1871, p. 716).  
 Marshall, too, was persuaded that cooperation “does rest in a great 
measure on ethical motives” and “has a special charm for those in whose 
tempers the social element is stronger” (see Marshall 1890, p. 292). The true 
co-operator, he wrote, “combines a keen business intellect with a spirit full 
of an earnest faith” and the cooperative movement “makes it its task to 
develop the spontaneous energies of individuals by educating them to 
collective action and teaching them to use collective resources for the 
attainment of shared goals.” Although he did not deny affinities between 
cooperation and other movements, he emphasised that no other movement 
was as directly aimed to improve the quality of man himself (see Marshall 
                                                            
47 As argued by Vanek (1971a, p 107), the fact that every week a man spends no fewer than 
forty of the most active hours of his life in a working environment where conflict is endemic 
must necessarily have an adverse impact on his whole life.   
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1889, p. 227); and he put “the production of fine human beings” at the top of 
the list of the primary goals of this movement (see Marshall 1889, p. 228).  
 My line of reasoning so far may explain why I strongly disagree with 
all those Marxists who declare an interest in cooperation, but cling to the 
view that centralised planning (though not of the Soviet type) is a necessary 
constituent of socialism. Marx and Engels thought of socialism as a planned 
system because they were averse to markets and this aversion can quite 
naturally be traced to their Aristotelian view of man as a social animal. In 
two fine books, Cornu, who is one of the acutest commentators of Marx, 
tells us that Feuerbach and Hess thought of economic and social 
contradictions as generated by an ethical conflict between egoism and 
altruism (see Cornu 1948 and 1955). When Marx dealt with this conflict in 
the Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philsophy of Right (which dates 
from 1843) – Cornu argues – he translated it into a social conflict proper and 
by so doing he turned Communism into a doctrine of action, transferred the 
social problem to the ethical plain (as Feuerbach had done) and postulated 
its possible solution through altruism and love (Cornu 1948, pp. 154-55). 
Hence, there are reasons to argue that, as Marx had been thinking of 
individuals as social animals since his early youth, he tended to identify 
socialism which planning, which requires unselfish individuals, and not with 
a system of democratic firms which assumes, by its very nature, that 
individuals are selfish. On closer analysis, though, inasmuch as it is true that 
genes are selfish – as mentioned above – it is hardly possible to do without 
markets or to leave human instincts out of count.  
 Marx’s view of human nature has already been discussed above. 
Here, it is interesting to note that both his firm choice of communism and 
his aversion to markets, which account for his advocacy of centralised 
planning, date back to 1943, his twenty-fifth year of age, and it is a well- 
known fact that youthful decisions, especially if prompted by strong 
emotions, often remain pervasive influences throughout a man’s life.  
 The same misconception is apparent in Gramsci, a supporter of the 
Bolshevik revolution who went to far as to argue that in a socialist society 
“the average proletarian psychology will quickly lose all the mythological, 
utopian, religious, petit-bourgeois ideologies: the communist psychology 
will quickly and permanently be consolidated, constantly roused by 
revolutionary enthusiasm” (Gramsci 1919-1920, p. 30). In addition to this, 
he wrote that “it is possible to imagine the coercive element of the State 
withering away by degrees, as ever more conspicuous elements of regulated 
society (ethical State or civil society) make their appearance” (Gramsci 
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1975, vol. II, p. 764).48 On closer analysis, however, these reflections are not 
only unrelated to gene selfishness and where they should be brought to bear 
on issues associated with centralised planning they would have to be 
supported by evidence (which Gramsci did not provide) that a planned 
system would actually generate solidarity feelings. Not for nothing his claim 
was proved utterly wrong by the course of events in the countries organised 
in keeping with the system known as ‘state socialism’.  
  
Conclusion 
 The author’s main proposition is that democratic firm management, 
one of the two ways to establish socialism, is more consistent with human 
nature, which is shaped by selfish genes. ! His second proposition is that 
democratic firm management can be implemented more easily than 
centralised planning since the retention of markets allows the selfish drives 
of human beings to act themselves out to the full. His third proposition is 
that democratic firm management is the type of socialist revolution that is 
more in keeping with Darwinian evolutionism.    
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